Jun 06 2022
The International Criminal Court, Iraq and the Game of Power
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CONTENTS1. Introduction 3
2. Neorealism and the Theory of International Relations......... 5
* Anarchy and Structure in the International System......... 6
* Social Constructivism in International Relations and the Institution of Sovereignty........ 8
3. Power and Governance in the International System.............. 12
4. The International Criminal Court and the Debate Surrounding It.......... 16
* The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court... 17
* The United States and the International Criminal Court.. 19
* Romania and Its Role in the Debate Surrounding the ICC 27
5. The War in Iraq and the Transatlantic Debate... 32
* The Case for War and the Regime Change 33
* The Case Against War.... 39
* The US Want for European Allies in Iraq 41
* Romania Between the United States and the European Union............ 49
6. Conclusions... 57
7. Bibliography. 61
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?1. IntroductionLately Romania seems to have had to choose sides between the United States of America (further US) and the European Union (further EU). The reason for this circumstance lies in the power competition developed between these two international actors in several issue areas. In order to understand the country’s position and, thus the choices that it made we started with the question ‘How can Romania’s choice be explained?’ It must be made clear from the outset that this paper is not merely a foreign policy analysis. Rather it intends to delineate a pattern of behaviour that could be reproduced in time and under similar circumstances. It is my belief that the reasons that determined Romania’s decision could also be accountable for similar response coming from other countries found in the same situation. Hence, the paradigm in which this research falls into is international relations theory.
The hypothesis on which this research paper is based upon is that when involved in a power competition the reasonable option for Romania is to bandwagon, i.e. to join the stronger side. However the competition that ensued is marked by the different aspects of power employed: while the US relies on the authority provided by their prestige as a great power, the EU stresses the authority endorsed by legal obligations for the states under the common EU legislation (the acquis communautaire). The dichotomy appears clearly in the way both the US and the EU try to influence the choices that Romania made.
In short, the argument presented here relies on two conditions that explain why the US was successful in attracting countries like Romania on its side. On the one hand, the emphasis is on the structure of the international system, and its consequent mechanisms of control, which influences all member states, some of them to a higher degree than others. On the other hand, Romania’s own perception determined it to bandwagon, instead of complying with the legal obligations that it assumed in relation with the EU.
Such statement entails a short elucidation. The first part of the argument that will be developed here points towards a systemic theory of international relations, one in which structure holds primacy over agents, i.e. states, Romania included. The second assumption seems to turn the first one upside down, by placing agent’s actions at the forefront. This is however not the case, as there is no place for an agent-structure debate in this paper. Instead, a systemic theory will be applied on account of its greater explanatory power. Yet such a theory is not a holistic one, therefore, some elements must also be added so that the general explanation can become relevant in particular cases.
Currently there are two main schools of thought that compete with each other in the realm of international relations theory. The first school of thought, best known as neorealism (or structural realism) maintains a materialistic perspective about the nature of international relations. Because sovereign states exist in an anarchic world, i.e. one without any form of international government, the only mechanism that explains the actions of states is the distribution of power among them. Furthermore, states’ ultimate concern is to survive in an often-hostile environment.
A second school, one that is usually associated with the name neoliberal institutionalism, argues for an international legal system based on norms, rules and practices, which determine a high degree of convergence in the actions of the states involved. Such scholars argue for institutional frameworks (sometimes termed international regimes) that compel states to comply with their normative provisions and which foster co-operation on various issue areas.
Neoliberalism’s great shortcoming is its emphasis on co-operation among states, at the expense of the other important process in inter-state relations, namely competition. For our purpose it is of vital importance to know where to draw the line between them, for it is competition, and not co-operation, that is under scrutiny in this paper. Yet, there are some areas of concern where the neorealist theory also reveals itself as incomplete for the development of the present argument, thus rendering the appeal to concepts and interpretations from other disciplines necessary. One such ancillary discipline is social constructivist scholarship.
In terms of operationalisation the reasonable option was for nonrandom, judgmental/purposive sample [1 Stella Z. THEODOULOU, “Starting from Scratch: The Research Process”, in Stella Z. THEODOULOU
and Rory O’BRIEN, Methods for Political Inquiry, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999, p. 147] that would allow the selection of two relevant cases. These cases are the US campaign against the International Criminal Court (further ICC) in the first months of 2002 and the US war in Iraq in the spring of 2003. The method used combines a comparative study of these two instances in the search for similarities and differences with a content analysis of primary and secondary data that would reveal the presence and the frequency of previously established idiosyncrasies.
2. Neorealism and the Theory of International Relations
Currently the discipline of international relations is passing through a stage of theory reconstruction. It found itself in such a position after the recovery from a state of agitation brought by the creation of new disciplines, such as international political economy, and the establishment of new research areas on the borderline of mainstream research, for example critical theory and feminist theory. The contribution of neorealism (mainly Waltzian) to the reconceptualisation of international relations’ theory is manifested in the systematic use of an economic mode of explanation. Its emphasis on market theory has brought neorealism closer to the rational-actor model proposed by neoliberal analysis.
There is a further distinction in today’s international relations scholarship, namely one that involves two different perspectives related to the perception of theory. On the one hand, theory is defined as a set of answers, on the other, as a set of questions. [2 Kjell GOLDMANN, “An Overview”, in GOODIN and KLINGEMANN (eds.), A Handbook of Political Science, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 424] According to the former definition, the role of theory is to examine whether its implications accord with our preferences. The role of the second implication is to refute theories by empirical observation and conceptual reflection. [3 K. GOLDMANN, 1996, p. 424 ] It is the second perspective, i.e. the use of theory as a set of questions, which is embraced by this paper.
The argument presented here is twofold, as it acknowledges both indigenous and extraneous elements that support the hypothesis on which this paper is based. The external factor is envisaged by the constraints imposed on Romania by the structure of the international system and its consequent mechanisms of control. The domestic factor is Romania’s own perception about the shape and functions of the international system and the role played within it by the most powerful actors.
This paper is based on several assumptions about the international system, its composing units (namely sovereign states) and underlying principles (like international anarchy, actors’ identity, power and governance in the international system) and they will be subsequently analysed in the following chapters. Besides Romania there are also two international actors under scrutiny: a sovereign state, namely the US, and an international organisation, that is the EU. If the former can rightfully be considered a unitary actor, the latter is an organisation that promotes political and economic unity among its member states. Such a unity is based especially on the treaties signed by each of the constituents and on a common body of legislation under which all are equal (called acquis communautaire).
However the inner structure and composition of the international actors is of little importance for this analysis, insofar as they are considered as competing entities. It is irrelevant for our discussion whether a republican or a democrat president was in office in Washington during those particular moments, just as it is immaterial to inquire how many countries pertaining to the EU favoured or opposed America’s actions, so long as they used one voice for expressing either support or opposition.
What is relevant for this argument is the similarity in the functions that entities in the international arena perform. [4 For a more detailed argument see Kenneth N. WALTZ, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1979, esp. Ch. 5, “Political structures” ] Indeed there is a similarity in the way both the US and the EU approach the Romanian government when demanding adherence. Each of the two entities, namely the US and the EU, intended to deliver their message in a conspicuous and straightforward manner in order to capture most of the benefits. Thus, the US and the EU are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform, but by the success of their endeavour.
Anarchy and Structure in the International System
The context in which international actors operate is that of international anarchy. The term ‘anarchic’ is used here in a specific sense, that is the lack of government or other form of recognised authority above that of the sovereign state. Thus states must rely on their own strategies and resources, rather than on outside authority, to maintain their status and achieve their goals.
A system that lacks central authority is not one without order, as anarchy should not be mistaken for chaos. In the international system order emanates principally from its configuration, namely a hierarchical positioning of states according to their power, relative to each other. Higher power endowments place the great powers (especially the US) at the top, with the lesser powers following behind.
One reason that illustrates why some initiatives were successful and others were not lies in the structure of the international system. The argument that follows considers the structure of the international system as having a notable importance. By structure here should be understood a set of constraining conditions, a selector that indirectly ushers one particular outcome rather than another. [5 Kenneth N. WALTZ, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories”, in Robert O. KEOHANE (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 62 ] In itself the structure does not directly lead to one result rather than another. However it affects behaviour in the system indirectly, in two ways: through socialisation and through competition. [6 Kenneth N. WALTZ, 1986, p. 63] And it is the competitive aspect of actors’ behaviour that is here under scrutiny.
The way in which the international system is shaped is in accordance with the idea that “The nature of the international system determines whose interest are being served by the functioning of the system”. [7 Robert GILPIN, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 10 ] This is just another way of saying that in the international system the units with the highest prestige set the scene of action for themselves as well as for others. [8 K. WALTZ, 1986, p. 61
] Indeed, according to the realist perception the possession of power capabilities make the stronger states influence the weaker ones.
Arguing for such a conception entails the need for further clarification. In a system composed of a structure and of units that interact, it is the role of the structure to assert the difference between the active parts. The means to do that lies with the distribution of power among the entities partaking in the international system. Such a distribution however bears little relevance as unit’s attribute, and should be perceived as a system-wide property. It is only within such a system that a more powerful entity can influence a less powerful one. They must both be part of the same system for the power to make its presence felt.
This same idea has been approached elsewhere:
“Great powers are powers recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great powers, for example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole”. [9 Hedley BULL, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, second edition, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 196]
This way of looking at the international system, i.e. a hierarchical positioning of states in accordance with the relative distribution of power among them, opens the door for criticism on the grounds of circular argument. If the workings of the system can be explained through the underlying distribution of power, than the power position can be deduced by measuring the share of the most effective means that actors have under their control. More clearly, if on the one hand the distribution of power is the main criterion for explaining outcomes, than on the other, in some cases, the outcomes make up the basis for the assessment of power. Such criticism will be dealt with by dichotomising the power phenomena into two referents: one for agent and another for structure. Furthermore the concept of power will be considered to posses both a coercive, as well as an attractive component.
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